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Advertising Traded Goods
Henry W. Kinnucan
Nerlove  and Waugh's theory of cooperative (generic) advertising is extended to the
case of traded goods. Results suggest that trade reduces the incentive to promote by
enlarging the  effective  supply  or  demand  elasticity  facing the  industry.  This is
especially true in the net exporter situation where the enlarged demand elasticity
(relative  to  the  autarky  case)  limits  the  ability  to  shift  advertising  costs  onto
consumers.  Simulations  of the  model  using  data and  parameter  values for  the
California egg industry suggest that ignoring trade prejudices benefit-cost ratios in
favor of the promotion program. The upward bias, moreover, is significant even when
the trade share is modest.
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Introduction
This article focuses on returns to generic advertising for agricultural products that move
freely across political boundaries, hereafter referred to as "traded goods." Traded goods
represent the norm rather than the exception for the some  55 commodities covered by
promotion checkoffs (Forker and Ward, pp.  102-03; Neff and Plato). Yet the scholarly
literature  is virtually devoid  of studies that elucidate the economic impacts of adver-
tising  traded  goods  in any systematic  fashion.  Early  work by  Nerlove  and  Waugh
remains the theoretical foundation for much of the literature on advertising benefit-cost
analysis  (e.g.,  see  Ferrero  et al.).  Nerlove  and Waugh's  analysis,  however,  applies
strictly  to nontraded  goods.  Trade is taken  into account  in recent  work by  Piggott,
Piggott, and Wright, and by Kinnucan and Christian, but their models assume that the
promoting industry  is a net exporter.  In  an important paper,  Alston,  Carman,  and
Chalfant consider the returns to generic advertising in a small, open-economy setting,
but their analysis  is confined to a graphical treatment  of the problem and does not
consider the net importer case.
The purpose of this research is to determine the effectiveness  of generic advertising
in instances  where the advertised  good faces  competition  from foreign  supplies and
trade barriers are low or absent so that open-economy conditions prevail. The analysis
builds on Nerlove and Waugh's theory of cooperative (generic) advertising by extending
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their model to the traded-good case in which a portion of the advertising cost is shared
with consumers via "tax shifting" (Chang and Kinnucan).  The model is general in the
sense  that trade  status  is endogenous.  That is,  both the net importer  and the  net
exporter case can be analyzed with a simple redefinition of the trade variable. For the
net importer case, a parameter is included to take into account cost sharing with foreign
producers when a promotion levy is imposed on imports to prevent free riding.
Following  presentation of the model and comparative-static  results, we  apply the
model to egg advertising in California to demonstrate its empirical utility. A key finding
is  that ignoring  trade  can  prejudice  benefit-cost  ratios  in  favor  of the  advertising
program-and this is true even if trade exposure is modest.
The Model
Consider a competitive industry that produces  a tradeable  good and that advertises
strictly in the domestic market.1 Assume further that price is determined by market
forces, not the government. The industry ordinarily exports a portion of its production,
but depending upon domestic supply and demand conditions, the trade status can switch
from net exporter  to net importer.  The domestic market for the industry's product is
integrated with the world market so that the law of one price holds across all markets,
domestic and foreign. The industry represents a sufficiently small portion of the total
economy  such that the supply and demand for goods that are related to the industry's
good through consumer preferences  or production technology can be safely ignored, at
least as a first approximation. 2
With these assumptions, and holding constant all exogenous factors that affect supply
and  demand  except  advertising,  the structural  model  for this industry that defines
initial equilibrium is:
(1)  qD  = D(p, A),
(2)  qs  = S(p),
(3)  qT  = T(p),
(4)  qT  = qs -qD
(5)  R  =pqs - qs S  (u)du - QA,
where qD is the domestic quantity demanded, qs is the domestic quantity supplied, qT
is the quantity traded, p is market price, A is domestic advertising expenditures, and
R is net economic surplus (quasi-rent) accruing to domestic producers.
1The focus on domestic market promotion is for analytical convenience.  Principles  derived from the domestic promotion
case apply equally to export market promotion.
2 This assumption is in keeping with Nerlove  and Waugh's analysis.  For models that relax this assumption,  see Wohl-
genant (1993); Piggott, Piggott, and Wright; and Kinnucan (1997).
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The five endogenous variables in the system are assumed to be measured at the farm
level, i.e., the quantity variables (qT, qs, and qD) are expressed in farm-equivalent units,
p  is the farm-gate price, and R is rent at the farm level.  Thus, D is a derived demand
relationship  and S is a primary supply relationship.
The trade relation,  T,  differs in its interpretation  depending  on  trade  status.  If
the country or region in question is a net exporter of the advertised commodity, then
qT > 0,  and T is an export demand relation. If the country or region is a net importer,
then qT < 0, and T is an import supply relation.
S-1 is the primary supply curve written in inverse form,  i.e.,  price as a function of
quantity in equation (2). The Q term in the rent equation is an incidence parameter to
account for "tax shifting," i.e., the hypothesis that a portion of the advertising cost is
shifted to consumers when advertising funds  are raised through a per unit levy in a
competitive market (Chang and Kinnucan). Specifically,  Q is the proportion of the per
unit levy that is borne by producers.  (A precise mathematical definition is given later.)
When the trade status is net importer, a promotion tax is frequently levied on imports
to prevent free riding. In these instances, the cost of advertising is shared with foreign
producers. The  ) parameter in (5) is the portion of the advertising funds collected from
domestic producers.  If no levy is imposed on imports,  ) = 1.0; otherwise  ) is a positive
fraction.
Following  Nerlove  and Waugh,  A is treated  as  exogenous.3 It  appears  as a shift
variable in the derived demand relation, even though advertising ordinarily  occurs at
retail. Thus, we abstract from the marketing channel-a simplification that is innocuous
as long as  the demand  elasticity is measured  at the  farm level  and  the  industry's
aggregate  marketing technology  is fixed proportions  (Kinnucan  1997), a maintained
hypothesis in this study.
More difficult to justify is the simple-shift specification,  since generic advertising in
some instances may cause the demand  curve to rotate  (e.g.,  Quilkey).  However,  the
simple-shift specification is consistent with Stigler and Becker's view that advertising
provides  information,  a view that enjoys empirical  support (e.g., Ding and Kinnucan,
pp. 359-60; also see Kinnucan et al. and the references cited therein). The simple-shift
specification is also consistent with Nerlove and Waugh's model, and thus permits direct
comparison of results.
Analysis
The first task is to determine the effect of an increase in advertising on net producer
surplus. For this purpose, express (1)-(5) in total differential form:
(1')  dln(qD)  = -Idln(p)  + pdln(A),
(2')  dln(qs)  = edln(p),
3A reviewer suggested that perhaps it may be more appropriate  to model advertising as endogenous, dependent on the
tax rate and industry output.  However,  as will be shown later, the optimality conditions  are unaffected by the exogeneity
assumption as long as incidence is taken into account.
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(3')  dln(q)  = e dln(p),
(4')  dln(qT)  = (qs/qT)dln(qs)  - (qD/qT)dln(qD),
(5')  dR  = pqsdln(p) - Q4)dA,
where dln(x) (= dxlx) is the relative change in variable x, ir is the absolute value of the
domestic demand elasticity, e is the domestic supply elasticity,  e (= (aqT/ap)(p/qT)) is the
price elasticity corresponding to the T function, and P (= (OqD/OA)(A/qD)) is a parameter
that indicates the percentage change in demand associated with a 1%  change in adver-
tising expenditures, holding  prices constant, hereafter referred to as the "advertising
elasticity." Given the negative  sign in equation (1'), all elasticities except e are defined
to be  positive.  That  is, the domestic  supply  curve  is upward  sloping,  the  domestic
demand curve is downward sloping, and advertising causes the domestic demand curve
to shift to the right.
The  sign of e  depends  on  trade status.  For a  net exporter,  qT  >  0,  and e  =  eD  is
interpreted  as an export demand elasticity.  For a net importer, qT < 0,  and e  = es is
interpreted as an import supply elasticity. In this analysis, eD is assumed to be negative,
and  es is  assumed  to be  positive.  Specifically,  the excess  demand  function  is non-
increasing and the excess supply function is nondecreasing.
The term dR in (5') represents the change in net producer surplus (hereafter called
"profit") associated with a small change in advertising expenditure. It can be seen that
price enhancement is a necessary condition for an increase in advertising to be profit-
able. The conditions  conducive to price  enhancement are determined  by substituting
(1')-(3') into (4') and solving for dln(p):
(6)  dln(p)  = {1/[(1 + k)e  +  ±l  - ke]}dln(A),
where k  = (qT/qD)  is the "trade share."  Note from  (6) that regardless  of trade status,
under the stated assumptions, an increase in advertising always increases price (unless
e is plus or minus infinity). For example, if the trade status is net importer, k < 0 and
e > 0, which means that -k e in (6) is positive, so the total expression is positive. [Since
(1  + k)  = qS/qD > 0, the first term in (6)'s denominator is always positive.]  Similarly, if
the trade status is net exporter, k  > 0 and e < 0, which again produces  a positive sign
for  -ke, and thus for (6).
That (6) represents a generalization of Nerlove and Waugh's analysis can be seen by
considering their comparable  expression [p. 818, equation (5)], which, in our notation,
is:
(7)  dln(p)  = [p/(e  + r)]dln(A).
Comparing (6) and (7), it is evident that (6) reduces to (7) when k = 0. Thus, Nerlove and
Waugh's analysis applies to nontraded goods only.
Both  (6)  and  (7)  are  consistent  in  showing that advertising's  price-enhancement
ability  increases  as domestic  supply or  domestic  demand becomes  less elastic  or as
consumers become more responsive to the advertising. Direct inspection of (6) indicates
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price enhancement is facilitated by a less elastic import supply or export demand curve,
as might be expected from Nerlove and Waugh's analysis for the autarky case.
Trade Share and Price  Enhancement
Intuitively, one would expect an increase in trade share to diminish advertising's price-
enhancement ability when advertising is confined to the domestic market. For example,
in the net exporter case,  an increase in export share would mean less of the total crop
being exposed to the advertising, and thus a weaker price effect. This may be checked
by setting C = P/[(1 + k)e + n -ke]  in (6)  and taking the derivative with respect to k to
yield:
OC/Ok  = p(e  - c)/[k(e  - e)  + e  + r]2.
For the net exporter case (k > 0 and e < O0),  9/lak is negative, which means an increase
in export share always diminishes advertising's price-enhancement  ability when adver-
tising occurs in the domestic market. Thus, intuition is confirmed in the net exporter
case.
For the net importer case (k  < 0 and e > 0), the effect of trade share on advertising's
price-enhancement ability hinges on the relative magnitudes of the supply elasticities.
For example, if import and domestic  supply are equally elastic (e = e), Od/Ok = 0, and
import share is irrelevant.  Conversely,  if import supply is more elastic than domestic
supply (e > E), the usual case given small-trader effects and the inelasticity of domestic
supply response for most agricultural products, then  QClak > 0. The positive derivative
in this case implies that a decrease in imports increases  advertising's price-enhance-
ment ability.
This result accords with intuition as well, but for a different reason than given for the
net exporter case.  In particular, in the net importer case, supply response, not adver-
tising exposure, is the causal mechanism.  This can be  seen by noting that as import
share declines,  so too does the portion of total supply that comes from the more elastic
source  when  e  <  e. With less  quantity coming  from the more  elastic  source,  supply
response is attenuated and this enhances  advertising's price effect.4
Fundamental  Returns Equation  for Traded Goods
The  effect  of a  change  in advertising expenditure  on industry  profit is obtained by
substituting (6) into (5'), which yields:
(8)  6R/6A  =  a/[(l + k)e  + q  - ke] - Q(),
where a = PpqslA, an expression that is loosely interpreted as "the marginal gross rev-
enue from increased advertising expenditures, holding prices constant [sic]"  (Nerlove
4A caveat in interpreting the foregoing analysis is that it assumes that  e and k are independent. Although this assumption
is plausible  for small changes in trade share, for large changes in trade share there is reason to believe that the absolute
values of e and k  are inversely related (Houck, p. 39), in which  case the relationships discussed above would be weakened.
Still, for small changes, which are required to interpret the derivative, the relationships hold without qualification.
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and Waugh, p. 819).5 [Ifqs = qD (autarky), a reduces topaq/dlaA, in which case the inter-
pretation is exact.] Equation (8) indicates the net effect of a small change in advertising
expenditure  on net producer surplus,  taking into account (a) supply response in the
domestic market, (b) equilibriating adjustments in the domestic and foreign markets in
response  to the  demand  increase in the  domestic  market,  and  (c)  advertising  cost
shifting and sharing. It is a net measure of marginal returns in that it takes into account
the incremental cost of the advertising [see equation (5')].
From (8)  it  is apparent that the  net marginal return (profit) is positive,  zero,  or
negative, depending on the relative magnitude of the marginal cost term Q4, as the first
term is  nonnegative  by  assumption.  Because  the first term,  a/[(1 + k)e +  r  -ke],  in
essence reflects advertising's price-enhancement ability, the previously discussed factors
that determine price enhancement also determine profitability.
Small, Open-Economy Problem
Consider now the issue raised by Alston, Carman, and Chalfant with respect to adver-
tising in a small, open economy.  A small, open-economy  situation  occurs when trade
barriers are absent  and the crop represented  by the promotion entity is too small in
relation to the total volume traded to affect price. This situation arises most particularly
(but  not  exclusively)  in  the  case  of  state-based  promotion  efforts.  For  example,
California  producers fund a wide variety  of promotion programs  through marketing
orders and state commissions  (Carman,  Cook, and Sexton, p.  140), some of which are
state-specific.  The point made by Alston, Carman, and Chalfant is that such programs
may be futile because price enhancement is problematic.
The reason why price enhancement is problematic in a small, open-economy situation
is that the excess supply or demand curve is horizontal. That is, the e parameter in (8)
is negative infinity in the net exporter case and positive infinity in the net importer
case.  In either case, (8) reduces to
6R/6A  = -Qa),
which means that the industry suffers a marginal loss equal to the incidence parameter
(adjusted for cost sharing with foreign producers, where applicable). 6 And this is true
regardless of the demand shift associated with the advertising, i.e., the magnitude of P,
a fact that highlights the dangers of single-equation modeling of advertising returns.
Potential  Biases from Ignoring Trade
What else can be learned from (8)? Consider a situation in which trade flows are modest,
i.e., domestic supply and demand are nearly in balance so that qT = 0. One might think
from (8) that it would then be safe to ignore the trade relation, as the k e term would be
5  Technically, (8) is apartial  total derivative (Chiang, p. 202) in that it holds constant the quantity-dependent parameters
k,  a, and ( at their initial equilibrium levels. To highlight this distinction, d in (5') is replaced by 6 in (8).
6 As noted by a reviewer, this result stems from the law of one price, which implicitly assumes that domestic and foreign
products are perfect  substitutes. If this is not the case, then it may be possible to raise  producer price through promotion.
(For an example  of a differentiated-good model,  see Goddard and Conboy.)
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close to zero. However, this conjecture  assumes that k and e are independent.  In fact,
as noted by Houck (p. 39),  \k  and  Iel are inversely related.  In particular, the excess
demand curve facing the net exporter becomes more elastic as exports decrease and, in
the limit, becomes perfectly elastic as k approaches zero (unless domestic production is
large relative to total volume traded). A parallel argument applies to the net importer
case. The upshot is that ignoring the trade relation is liable to prejudice the analysis in
favor  of the advertising program-and this is true whether trade shares are large or
small.
Optimal Advertising Expenditure for Traded Goods
Industry profits from advertising are maximized  when marginal net returns are zero,
i.e., 6R/6A  = 0 in equation (8).  However, as noted by Nerlove and Waugh, an optimum
expenditure level computed in this manner is likely to overstate the true optimum in
that it ignores  opportunity  cost.  The  opportunity  cost  of advertising  funds  can be
incorporated into the analysis by defining a parameter  p that represents the marginal
return  on  the  next-best  use  of  advertising  funds  (e.g.,  production  research;  see
Wohlgenant 1993).  In this case, industry profit is maximized when
6R/6A  = p.
Substituting (8) into this expression and solving forA (recalling that a = Ppqs/A) yields:
(9)  A*  = pqp/[((1 + k)e  + r  - ke)(Q4  + p)],
whereA* represents the advertising expenditure that maximizes net producer surplus,
taking into account opportunity cost. The optimal expenditure level varies directly with
the  factors  that increase  advertising's  price-enhancement  ability  (e.g.,  less  elastic
demand or supply) and that lower the effective cost of the advertising to the domestic
industry (lower opportunity cost, levy share, or incidence).  Incidence is determined by
supply and demand elasticities as follows:
(10)  Q =  /(e  +  ),
where  ri is the absolute value of the effective  demand elasticity, and  e is the effective
supply elasticity.
The effective demand and supply elasticities depend on trade status (see appendix).
For the net importer case,
A  = T,
e  =  r[(1 + k)e  - kes];
and for the net exporter case,
q  1  = (+k)-  + (1 +k)-ikl,
e  = TE,
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where T  =pl(p - t), and t is the per unit levy. Substitution of these expressions into (10)
yields the following:
(10a)  Incidence for net exporter:
Qx  = [r  + kleDl]/[r  + k  eDI  + (1  + k)Te];
(lOb)  Incidence for net importer, imports taxed:
OM  = r/[  + (1  + k)Te  - kres];
and
(lOc)  Incidence for net importer, imports not taxed:
QM  = [r  - kzes]l[rI + (1  + k)T'  - k-es].
In essence, trade enlarges the supply or demand elasticity facing the industry, and this
affects incidence.  In a closed  economy (k  = 0), the situation examined by Chang and
Kinnucan,  j = qE  and e = re, and producer incidence is always 100% (Qx = QM =  OQ = 1.00)
when supply is fixed (e  = 0). However, this is not necessarily true in an open economy
(k  ￿  0). In particular, as can be seen by comparing equations (10a)-(10c), producer inci-
dence is 100% with fixed domestic supply only if the industry is a net exporter.
Under the net importer case, a portion of supply comes from foreign producers, and
as long as this supply is not fixed,  the effective  supply elasticity is positive.  Conse-
quently, a portion of  the advertising tax is always shifted to consumers given downward-
sloping demand.  One implication is that, ceteris paribus, a net importer situation may
provide  a  more  favorable  environment  in  which  to  promote  than  a net  exporter
situation, at least from a cost-shifting perspective. An exception to this statement occurs
when imports are not taxed, in which case the domestic producer incidence approaches
one as e  - 0 [see (10c)].  Thus, a strong incentive exists to tax imports to prevent free
riding,  because by doing so the industry acquires  a larger budget and shifts a larger
portion of the advertising cost onto consumers.
Equation (9) may be compared to Nerlove and Waugh's optimality condition (p. 822)
for a nontraded good, which in our notation is:
(11)  A*N-W  = pqsP/[(E + 1)(1  + P),
where A* I  N-W is optimal advertising expenditure  as defined  by Nerlove  and Waugh.
Equation (9)  reduces to (11) when there is no trade  and producers bear the full inci-
dence  of the promotion levy, i.e.,  k  = 0,  and Q  =  (  =  1.  Thus, equations  (9)  and  (10)
represent  a generalization  of Nerlove  and  Waugh's  theory of cooperative  (generic)
advertising. 7
7 In fact, Nerlove and Waugh's result understates the optimum in that if 0 =  1.0 and demand is downward sloping, then
supply must be fixed, i.e., the e in equation (11) must vanish. (For further discussion of incidence in the closed-economy case,
see Alston, Carman, and Chalfant, pp. 159-60.)
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Comparison with Dorfman-Steiner  Theorem
The foregoing results may be compared to Dorfman and Steiner's result for a monopolist
who chooses advertising and price simultaneously to maximize profit:
(12)  0*M  =  /,
where 0* 1  M is optimal advertising intensity (advertising expenditure  divided by rev-
enue) for a monopolist with fixed output. The corresponding condition for a competitive
industry without trade may be obtained  from (11)  by replacing  1 +  p  with Q  +  p  (to
account for tax shifting) and substituting (10)  to yield:
(13)  *  lc = P/[  + P(e  + T)],
where 0*8 c is optimal advertising intensity for a competitive industry under autarky.
Comparing (12) and (13),  it  can be seen that the Nerlove-Waugh  condition reduces
to the Dorfman-Steiner theorem when opportunity cost is zero and allowance is made
for  tax  shifting. Identical  results  were  obtained  by Alston,  Carman,  and  Chalfant
(pp. 156-60) from a model that shifts the demand and supply curves simultaneously in
response to a combined increase in the advertising levy and advertising expenditure.
Thus, treating  advertising expenditures  as exogenous has no effect on the optimality
conditions provided tax incidence is taken into account.
The fact that the Nerlove-Waugh theorem reduces to the Dorfman-Steiner theorem
when tax shifting is taken into account suggests that the Dorfman-Steiner  theorem is
quite general. Becker and Murphy caution, however, that the Dorfman-Steiner condition
can be misleading since the theorem implicitly assumes that P and rn  are independent.
But when comparing the behavior of an oligopoly firm to that of a monopoly,  P and rn
are both expected to be larger for the oligopoly firm than for the monopoly,  since the
oligopoly firm faces  closer substitutes and can generate a larger advertising response
due to its ability to attract customers from closely competing firms. In this instance, it
is incorrect to infer from the Dorfman-Steiner theorem that a monopoly has a stronger
incentive to advertise than an oligopoly firm, since P and ir are not independent across
industry structures.
A more subtle point has to do with Nerlove and Waugh's observation:
Since payments must generally be approved by a majority of producers,  rates must
be kept low enough to continue to attract majority support. Any  purely economic
theory  of cooperative  advertising  can thus  set only  an  upper bound  to  optimal
expenditures  (p. 820).
Both the Dorfman-Steiner theorem, and the corresponding  condition for a traded good
[equations (9) and (10)],  fail to take into account the collective-good aspects of cooper-
ative advertising  (Hardin) and thus the incentive  to free  ride.  For this reason, it  is
unlikely that generic advertising will be socially excessive  in the sense  described by
Tremblay and Tremblay,  unless generic advertising generates  negative externalities
(e.g.,  poorer  diet).  That is, free-rider  incentives  reduce  the ability to fund collective
advertising at the economic optimum.
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Application
To illustrate how the theory works  and to highlight the key qualitative  results,  we
performed some simulations using baseline data and parameters for the California egg
industry, as detailed in table  1. The  California Egg Commission's (CEC's) promotion
program  is  of  interest  because  the  ads  appear  strictly  in  California,  which  has
characteristics  of a  small,  open  economy with respect  to the egg trade.  Specifically,
California accounts for less than  10% of national egg production,  and eggs are free to
move across state lines in response to changes in local supply or demand conditions.
California is a modest net importer of table eggs (10.2% average import share between
1993 and 1995), which provides an opportunity to assess the importance of accounting
for trade even when trade is apparently unimportant.
Parameterization
The demand and "domestic" (California) supply elasticities were selected to be consis-
tent with estimates in the literature  (see notes to table  1).  Since no estimates  were
available for the import supply elasticity, and intuition suggests this parameter should
be quite elastic owing to small-trader effects, e was set alternatively to 3, 6, and 12 to
gauge  the  importance  of this parameter  on  the  simulation  results.  To  distinguish
between  returns  over  different  time  horizons,  simulations  are  provided  with  e  set
alternatively to zero, 0.20, and 0.942. The latter two values correspond, respectively, to
Chavas and Johnson's estimate (pp. 331-32) of the short-run (one year) and long-run
(six years) supply response in the U.S. egg industry. Setting e = 0 provides  a measure
of returns for a time horizon when California egg production is fixed, say three months
or less.
Because the central purpose of  this simulation exercise is to determine the biases that
can arise when trade is ignored, we also simulated returns using Nerlove and Waugh's
counterpart to equation (8). The N-W relationship (p. 822) is obtained by substituting
(7) into (5'):
(14)  6R/6AIN-W  = a/(e  + r)  - Q(.
Comparing (14) and (8), the main difference between the two measures is that Nerlove
and Waugh's formula implicitly assumes a closed economy,  which is not true for the
California egg market. Thus, a comparison of the returns computed from (8)  and (14)
provides a' basis for assessing the importance of accounting for trade.s
In the baseline simulation, we set  ) = 0.898 (table  1), as California-produced  eggs
accounted for 89.8% of California consumption over the evaluation period, and imports
are  assessed  at  the  same  rate  as  California-produced  eggs  (Pierre).  In  the  final
simulations,  4 is  increased  and  decreased  to  assess the  impact of cost  sharing  on
marginal returns.  Incidence  is  modeled using (lOb),  the appropriate  equation  when
imports are assessed at the same rate as domestic production. The baseline values for
8Technically, in Nerlove and Waugh's equation, 0 =  4  = 1, as they did not consider advertising tax shifting or cost sharing.
Because the purpose of (14) is to isolate the effects of ignoring trade, we retain the Q and ( parameters.
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Table  1. Baseline Values  and Parameters for the California Egg Industry,
1993-95
Item  Definition  Value
Qs  National production of table eggs (mil.) a  188,012
qs  California production of table eggs (mil.) b  17,867
qs /Q  California share of national production  0.095
qD  California consumption of table eggs (mil.) b  19,864
qT  California imports of table eggs (mil.) b  -1,997
k  California trade share (qT/qD)  -0.102
p  California farm price of eggs ($/doz.)  0.494
v  Farm value (= pq/12)  ($ mil.)  736
A  CEC advertising expenditures ($ mil.)b  10.05
0  Advertising intensity (= A/v)  0.0137
Share of A paid by California producers (= 1 + k)b  0.898
rT  Ratio of market price to net price (= p/(p - t))b  1.015
P  California advertising elasticity d  0.019,  0.042
|  ~California demand elasticity (absolute value)e  0.15,  0.33
e  California supply elasticity f 0.00,  0.20,  0.942
e  California import supply elasticity  3,  6,  12
aSource: U.S. Department of Agriculture/Economic Research Service, Poultry  Yearbook, table 27 (updated
March 1997).
b Source: Robert D. Pierre, CEO, California  Egg Commission.
c Simple average of Large Egg price and Blend Egg price; source: Don Bell, poultry specialist, University
of California, Irvine.
dDerived from Schmit, Reberte,  and Kaiser's parameter estimates (contact author for details).
eValues  from Wohlgenant  (1989), and Chavas and Johnson, respectively.
f Source for latter two values: Chavas and Johnson.
the demand and advertising elasticities are qr  = 0.15 and P = 0.019. The elasticities are
increased to 0.33 and 0.042, respectively,  in the sensitivity analysis  to reveal how a
more elastic demand or a more effective advertising campaign affects marginal returns.
Simulation
Results  indicate  that marginal net returns  are  positive  for the baseline  parameter
values, but sensitive to trade, especially if domestic supply is fixed (table 2). Although
measured marginal returns without trade in all cases are higher than the corresponding
returns with trade, when domestic supply is fixed the upward bias from ignoring trade
is especially  severe, on the order of 204% to 815% (simulation 1).  Longer-run returns
show less bias (simulations 2 and 3), but in no case is the upward bias from ignoring
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Table 2.  Net Marginal Returns to Increased Generic Advertising With and
Without Accounting for Trade, California Egg Industry, 1993-95
Levy Incidence  (Q)  Marginal Returnb
Calif.
Cost Share  With  W/O  With  W/O
Simulations a  ())  Trade  Trade  Trade  Trade  Ratioc














No. 2:  (e  = 0.20;  r  = 0.15;  P = 0.019;  k =  -0.102)
e = 3  0.898  0.23
e = 6  0.898  0.16
e = 12  0.898  0.10
No. 3:  (e  = 0.942;  q  = 0.15;  p = 0.019;  k =  -0.102)
e=3
e=6
e =  12

































r  = 0.15;  P = 0.042;  k = -0.102)
0.898  0.11
0.898  0.09
0.898  0.07  (



































No. 8:  (e  = 0.00;  rl = 0.15;  p = 0.019; k = -0.148)
e  = 3  0.852  0.26
e=  6  0.852  0.15







a Definitions of terms are as follows:  e  =  domestic  (California) supply elasticity,  q =  domestic demand
elasticity (absolute value),  P = advertising elasticity,  e = import supply elasticity, and k = import share.
b Returns with trade were computed from text equations (8) and (10b); returns without trade were comput-
ed from (14) and (10b).
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trade less than 19%  for the baseline  parameter values. The attenuation of bias in the
longer-run returns is largely due to less bias in the measured incidence,  as the values
for 0  in the trade and autarky scenarios converge as e becomes larger (e.g., compare Q
in simulations  1 and 3). Unless indicated otherwise, the remaining discussion focuses
on long-run returns, i.e.,  results for e  = 0.942.
Long-run returns are relatively insensitive to the demand and import supply elasti-
cities, but quite sensitive to the advertising elasticity (simulations 3-5, table 2). Holding
the import supply elasticity constant at e = 6, if consumers are relatively price sensitive
so  that rl  =  0.33,  marginal  returns  drop  from  $0.78  to  $0.61  (simulation  3  versus
simulation 4), and if consumers are relatively responsive to promotion so that P = 0.042,
marginal  returns  increase  from  $0.78  to  $1.82  (simulation  3 versus  simulation  5).
Increasing the import supply elasticity from 3 to 12 causes marginal returns for baseline
parameters  to drop  from $0.96 to $0.56 (simulation 3). Overall,  for the hypothesized
parameter values, bias is less sensitive to elasticity values than returns, especially for
long-run simulations.
Tax  shifting  exerts  its greatest  influence  in the  long run.  Specifically,  as  supply
becomes  more  elastic relative to demand,  a greater portion of the promotion  levy is
shifted to consumers. This serves to counteract the dampening effect of supply response
on producer  profit.  The importance  of tax shifting is evidenced  by the values of the
incidence  parameter  in table  2:  in the  short run,  producers  bear  between  10%  and
23%  of the incremental  advertising cost  depending  on the  import supply  elasticity
(simulation  2);  in the long run,  producer  incidence  for the same  parameter  values
declines to between 7% and 11% (simulation 3). The low producer incidence is due to the
combination of an inelastic demand and a highly elastic supply response due to small-
trader  effects.  That California  producers  can escape  much  of the  advertising  costs
through tax shifting may explain their willingness to invest in advertising despite the
a priori modest effect on price.
Suppose that the CEC is unaware of tax shifting, i.e., management believes that the
full cost of the adverting levy is borne by producers. Under this condition, a "perceived"
return can be computed from (8) by setting 0  =  1. The most interesting results are for
long-run returns (table 2), because  the differences  between the actual and perceived
incidences are the largest. In this case, the model produces marginal returns of between
-0.27  and 0.17 for the baseline elasticities (simulation 6). The fact that these returns
go through zero suggests that the industry may be operating near its long-runperceived
optimum, as profits are maximized, ignoring opportunity cost, when 8R/6A  = 0.
Returning to the bias issue  (the main point of this exercise),  suppose  that import
share was reduced from  10.2% to 2.0%, the 1993 value. What then would be the bias
from ignoring trade? We present results for fixed supply (table 2), as they illustrate the
point most forcefully. The bias is between 40% and 160%, smaller than when the import
share is  10.2% (compare simulations  1 and 7), but still substantial. Moreover,  simu-
lation 7 probably understates the bias, as the with-trade returns assume that the import
supply  elasticity is constant  when in fact it  is likely to increase  as the  trade share
approaches zero (Houck, p. 39). Thus, significant biases can result from ignoring trade,
even if trade share is tiny.
Finally, consider the effect of trade on profit (table 2). In simulation 8, we retain the
supply and demand elasticities used in simulation 7  and increase the import share to
14.8%, the 1995 value. Even with this relatively modest increase in import share over
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Table  3.  Effect  of  Import Levy,  Opportunity Cost,  and  Trade Share  on
Optimal Advertising Intensity, California Egg Industry, 1993-95
Optimal Intensity (0*)
Opportunity Cost (p) /Optimal  Intensity (0*
Trade Share (k)  With Import Levy a  W/O  Import Levyb  Ratio
p = 0.10
k =  -0.05  0.0691  0.0326  0.47
k =  -0.10  0.0649  0.0209  0.32
k =  -0.15  0.0611  0.0154  0.25
k = -0.20  0.0578  0.0122  0.21
p = 0.20
k = -0.05  0.0464  0.0265  0.57
k = -0.10  0.0420  0.0178  0.42
k = -0.15  0.0383  0.0134  0.35
k = -0.20  0.0352  0.0107  0.30
aComputed  from text equations (9) and (lOb) with elasticities set to E = 0.942,  l = 0.15, P = 0.019, and e = 6;
actual intensity is 0.0137.
b Computed from text equations (9) and (lOc) using the same elasticities  as indicated in footnote a.
c Ratio = "W/O Import Levy" column divided by "With Import Levy" column.
baseline, profit drops sharply. For example, if the import supply elasticity is 6, our "best
guess" value, an isolated increase in import share from 2% to 14.8% causes the marginal
return to fall from $4.60 to $1.26. And this reduction in profitability occurs despite the
higher cost sharing with non-California producers that occurs as imports increase. The
apparent  sensitivity  of returns  to  trade  share  is  a  new  result  in  the  commodity
promotion literature.  It  may help explainre  the  recent failures of the U.S. wool and cut-
flower promotion referendums, as both of these industries face strong competition from
imports.
Optimal Intensity
By way of summary, and to illustrate the importance of the import levy on promotion
incentives,  we  computed  the  optimal  advertising  intensity  using  the  baseline
parameters, equation (9), and the appropriate incidence relation (table 3). Specifically,
for the "with import levy" scenario, optimal intensity is computed from (9) and (lOb); for
the  "without  import  levy"  scenario,  (9)  and  (lOc)  are  used.  For  each  scenario,  the
opportunity-cost parameter p is set alternatively to 0.10 and 0.20. These values are not
meant  to  be  exhaustive,  but  rather  to  indicate  sensitivity  of optimal  advertising
decisions to opportunity cost. Since trade effects are the primary focus of this research,
the simulations  in table  3 consider the optimal intensity for values of k ranging from
-0.05  to -0.20,  values that represent the recent trend in import shares in the California
egg market.
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Results indicate that the optimal intensity declines as trade share increases, but the
decline is attenuated by the import levy (table 3). For example, when p = 0.10, optimal
intensity declines from 0.0691 to 0.0578 as import share increases from 5% to 20% with
the import levy; the corresponding decrease without the import levy is from 0.0326 to
0.0122. The reason for the attenuation is that the import levy permits cost sharing with
non-California  producers  to  increase  in  conjunction  with  imports.  This  situation
mitigates the  negative  effect  on profits  of the increased  supply response  associated
with the larger import share. The sharp reduction in optimal intensity when the import
levy is removed  (e.g.,  from 0.0649  to 0.0209 when  k  = -0.10  and p  =  0.10) hints  at
the importance  of the import levy for garnering  California producer  support for the
program.
Increasing  the opportunity cost to 0.20 attenuates  the incentives  provided by the
import levy, but not substantially so (table 3).  Overall, the optimal intensities for the
"with import levy" scenario range from 0.0578 to 0.0691 when opportunity cost is 0.10,
and from 0.0352 to 0.0464 when opportunity cost is 0.20. Thus, results are sensitive to
opportunity cost. That the optimal intensities exceed the observed intensity of 0.0137
is  consistent  with  Nerlove  and Waugh's  observation  cited  earlier  that cooperative
advertising is likely to be underfunded  due to free-rider effects.
Concluding Remarks
The major  contribution  of this  research  is  theory  development.  In  particular,  our
analysis  extends Nerlove  and Waugh's theory of cooperative  (generic) advertising to
the case of traded goods where the advertising cost is shared with consumers through
tax  shifting  and,  where  applicable,  with  foreign  producers  through  advertising
import levies. It  builds on the work of Alston,  Carman, and Chalfant by putting their
graphical analysis into mathematical  form and by extending their analysis to the net
importer case. The net importer case has some unique aspects,  not the least of which
is the  expanded  role  for  supply  response  as  a  determinant  of generic  advertising
effectiveness.
A caveat in interpreting our simulations is that they are meant to be illustrative of
the principles involved, and not to provide a benefit-cost analysis of the California egg
promotion program per se. To do that would require inter alia econometric estimation
of the import supply elasticity, which is beyond the scope of this research. Then, too, the
analysis ignores demand interrelationships, which may cause returns to be overstated
(Kinnucan  1996).  Bearing in mind these caveats,  one might conjecture  based on our
simulations  that  the  California  egg  promotion  program  has  been  profitable  for
California egg producers. Even so, there is no assurance that this situation will continue
since California  is rapidly becoming  a major  egg importer,  and theory  indicates  an
inverse relationship between import share and advertising profitability when import
supply is more elastic than domestic supply.
[Received April 1998;  final revision received  December 1998.]
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Appendix:
Derivation of Incidence Relationships
For simplicity,  consider the linear model:
(Al)  qD  = a - bp  (domestic demand),
(A2)  qs  = c +  dps (domestic supply),
(A3)  s  = P - t  (net price),
(A4a)  qx = e  - fp  (export demand),
(A4b)  qM  = g +  hps  (import supply with import levy),
(A4c)  qM  =  g +  hp  (import supply without import levy),
(A5a)  qx  = qs - qD  (market clearing/net exporter case),
(A5b)  qM  = qD - qs  (market clearing/net importer case),
where the slope parameters b,  f,  and h are  positive,  and d is nonnegative  to permit fixed  domestic
supply. In the above model, we abstract from advertising and focus on the effect of the per unit levy t
on net price Ps.
Net Exporter Case
For the net exporter case, substitute (A1)-(A4a) into (A5a) and solve for ps to yield:
(A6)  pS  =  K 1 - [(b  +  f)/(b +  f  +  d)]t,
where  K1 is a constant term of no direct relevance to the analysis, and p  is the net price in competitive
equilibrium. Taking the derivative of (A6) with respect to t gives the comparative-static  result:
(A7)  apl/at = -(b  +  f)/(b +  f  +  d),
which may be used to analyze producer incidence.  Since b and f  are positive, and d is nonnegative by
assumption,  (A7) is negative, i.e.,  an increase  in the levy always reduces the equilibrium  net price.
Incidence  depends on the relative magnitudes  of b, d, and f.  In particular, if domestic supply is fixed
(d = 0) or export demand perfectly elastic  (f  =  oo), then ap/lat  = -1,  and producers  bear the full inci-
dence, as expected. For other permissible parameter values,  0  <  ap  /t  l  < 1, i.e.,  producer incidence
is bounded between zero and one.
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To express  (A7) in terms of producer incidence  and elasticities, let  Qx =  :aps/*tl and define:
(A8a)  rl  = bp/qD (recalling that il is defined as absolute value),
(A8b)  e  = dps/qs,
(A8c)  eD  = fP/qx.
Substituting Qx and (A8a)-(A8c) into (A7) yields:
Ox  = [(qD/qs)r  +  (qx/qs) leD]/[(qD  /qS)r  +  (qx/qs) I  e  + (P/Ps)e  ]
Substituting the identities  k  = qx/qD, (1 +  k)  =  qs/qD, and  -=  P/Ps into the above expression and simpli-
fying yields:
(A9)  Qx  = [rl + kleDl]/[rl + kleD  + (1 +  k)Te],
which is identical to text equation (lOa).
Net Importer Case
For the net importer case,  two  sub-cases  need to be considered:  one  in which imports are taxed to
prevent free riding, and one in which imports are exempted. For the taxed case, (A4b) is applicable, and
we substitute this equation and (A1)-(A3)  into (A5b) to yield:
(A10)  ps  = K  - [b/(b +  d  +  h)]t,
which  gives the comparative-static  derivative:
(All)  ap/lat = -b/(b  +  d +  h).
From (All), producers never bear the full incidence when both domestic production and imports are
taxed. In fact, if h = oo  (small-trader case),  ps /t  =  0,  and producer  incidence is zero.
If imports are  exempted,  imports respond to p, which  is higher than Ps, the net price to domestic
producers. In this case (A4c) is applicable, and we substitute this equation and (A1)-(A3) into (A5b) to
yield:
(A12)  = K  - [(b  +  h)/(b +  h +  d)]t,
which gives the comparative-static derivative:
(A13)  Op/*lt  = -(b  +  h)/(b +  h +  d).
Comparing (All) and (A13), it can be seen that (domestic) producer incidence rises when imports are
not taxed. In fact, if domestic supply is fixed (d = 0), or if import supply is perfectly elastic (h = oo), then
apr/at  = -1,  and domestic  producers  bear the full  incidence.  Thus,  a strong incentive  exists to tax
imports to prevent free riding.
To express (All) and (A13) in terms of producer incidence and elasticities, define:
(A8d)  e s = hps/qM (with import levy),
es = hp/q M (without import levy).
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Substituting these expressions  and (A8a) and (A8b) into (All) and (A13) yields:
M  = ilrl  +  (qs/qD)  (P/Ps)  +  (qM/qD)(p/Ps)e s ]
and
QM  = [q  + (qMq)(p/ps)es]/[rS  +  (qs/q)(s)  +  (qM/qD)(PS)es],
where  QM = \ap  /at\ corresponds to producer incidence when imports are taxed [equation (All)], and
QM  =  ap*/atl corresponds to producer  incidence when imports are not taxed [equation (A13)]. Substi-
tuting the identities  k = -qM/qD,  (1 +  k)  = qs/qD,  and · =p/Ps into the foregoing expressions yields:
(A14a)  QM  = rl/[r  + (1  +  k)TE  - k-e s]
and
(A14b)  Q/  = [n - kTes]/[rI + (1  + k)T  - kTes],
which are identical to text equations (lOb) and (lOc).
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